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Abstract 
While it is well established that humans respond to inequity, it remains unclear the extent to 
which this behavior occurs in our nonhuman primate relatives.  By comparing a variety of 
species, spanning from New World and Old World monkeys to great apes, scientists can begin to 
answer questions about how the response to inequity evolved, what the function of this response 
is, and why and how different contexts shape it. In particular, research across nonhuman primate 
species suggests that the response is quite variable across species, contexts and individuals. In 
this paper, we aim to review these differences in an attempt to identify and better understand the 
patterns that emerge from the existing data with the goal of developing directions for future 
research. To begin, we address the importance of considering socio-ecological factors in 
nonhuman primates in order to better understand and predict expected patterns of cooperation 
and aversion to inequity in different species, following which we provide a detailed analysis of 
the patterns uncovered by these comparisons. Ultimately, we use this synthesis to propose new 
ideas for research to better understand this response and, hence, the evolution of our own 
responses to inequity. 
KEY WORDS: inequity response; fairness; inequity aversion; nonhuman primates; species 
comparison 
The concept of fairness is highly developed in humans and pervasive in many aspects of our 
culture. Children complain to mothers over sibling rivalry, employees compare salaries and 
search for justifications over disparities, and more recently, people living in major cities in the 
USA have been protesting Wall Street in order to combat economic inequality. How is it that 
such a strong sentiment can unite thousands of people in support for a cause, risking immediate 
costs, such as arrest, for a more long-term yet distant goal? Moreover, how do humans decide 
what is fair or not? How can the Occupy Wall Street protesters and the Wall Street businessmen 
both think that their position represents a fair solution? By studying the responses to inequity in 
nonhuman primates, we can begin to answer these questions about the evolutionary roots of 
fairness. Moreover, by understanding these evolutionary roots, we can begin to consider the 
complexity of fairness in humans, what factors drive such different opinions about what is fair, 
and how language and culture might contribute to this. 
Specifically, research on responses to inequity with nonhuman primates can help us 
understand why the sense of fairness evolved, and how it affects individuals within different 
social contexts. A variety of social contexts, depending on each individual’s sex, age, or rank, 
can be investigated in nonhuman primate species to shed light on how human social relationships 
may shape responses to inequity based on each individual’s expectations. By comparing a variety 
of species, spanning from New World and Old World monkeys to great apes, scientists have 
used a behavioral phylogeny approach to investigate the likelihood of common descent for the 
response to inequity. This technique can help answer questions about how this response evolved, 
what the function of this response is, and why and how different contexts shape it. Specifically, it 
can help clarify whether the response represents a homology, meaning it shares a common 
evolutionary origin, or whether it converged in several species due to similar selective pressures, 
absent shared descent.  
Several theories have been put forth to help explain negative reactions to inequity. For 
instance, it may be that a negative response to inequity evolved within a social context in order to 
recognize and avoid future inequity. This process may have occurred through steps that each 
increased fitness for individuals (Brosnan, 2006). First, individuals may recognize that another 
individual obtains rewards that are different from one’s own, and then feel strongly enough to 
react to this discrepancy, which, if it caused the individual to sample the environment and 
explore other potential partners, could lead to increased fitness.  Ultimately, this may lead to 
responses such as sacrificing a positive (but lower value) reward in order to restore equity or to 
punish the other individual, something humans are known to do (see Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012, 
this issue). Alternately, inequity may have evolved from non-social, more generalized reward 
mechanisms that exist in multiple contexts, such as loss aversion (Chen & Santos, 2006; Raihani 
& McAuliffe, 2012, this issue).  In this case, individuals form expectations about rewards within 
different contexts, and compare these rewards to the initial expectation rather than a social 
reference point. Consequently, a negative response occurs when these expectations are violated 
in a way that does not benefit the individual.  
But whether or not the origins are social, what is the benefit of this response?  One 
hypothesis is that this negative response to inequity evolved in tandem with cooperation. 
Humans with a sense of fairness are proposed to be more likely to succeed in cooperative 
interactions (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), due to their greater ability to avoid cooperative interactions 
which are not in their best interests.  Many social nonhuman primate species (and those in other 
taxa) also demonstrate cooperation in the wild, and also succeed in laboratory experiments on 
cooperation (Table 1). Joint tasks require effort from multiple individuals and demand an 
assessment of payoffs and contributions to determine whether it will provide some advantage to 
participants. In order to evolve, both individuals must receive some benefit from cooperating. 
Therefore, if one individual gets more than a partner, it benefits the partner to be able to 
recognize this inconsistency (whether or not consciously) and determine whether to continue 
cooperating or to find a better option. The short-term cost of losing the immediate rewards is 
worth the long-term gains of finding a new partner that will “play fair” and maximize both 
individuals’ payoffs. In addition, the overt response to inequity may function as a way to 
establish commitment (Frank, 1988, 2001; Yamagishi et al., 2009), signaling to one’s partner 
one’s expectations; you are interested in equity and you expect the same from him. Therefore, by 
responding in a way to resolve an iniquitous situation, you are advertising your commitment to 
and expectations for equity.  
However, the response is quite variable across contexts and individuals.  In fact, 
responses amongst primates are not always consistent, even within the same study (e.g., Brosnan 
et al., 2005; Brosnan et al., 2010b). This makes finding underlying causes and mechanisms more 
challenging, as they presumably interact with other features of the individual, the relationship, 
and the context. In this paper, we aim to review these differences across species and contexts in 
an attempt to identify and better clarify the patterns that emerge from the existing data. To begin, 
we provide a brief overview of how understanding socio-ecological factors in nonhuman 
primates can help predict expected patterns of cooperation and aversion to inequity in different 
species (specific ecological factors, social factors, and evidence from both the wild and captivity 
are summarized in Table 1 and are described in more detail in the Appendix).  We follow this 
with a detailed analysis of the patterns uncovered by these comparisons. Our ultimate goal is to 
propose new ideas for how to pursue an understanding of the large degree of variability and 
make specific predictions for future research. 
1. INEQUITY IN NON-HUMAN PRIMATES 
 We begin with a few important operational definitions.  In humans, we speak of fairness, 
justice, and so forth, but these terms describe phenomena that are not currently appropriate for 
discussion with other species (see Brosnan; Pierce & Bekoff; Horowitz, 2012, this issue, Bräuer 
& Hanus, 2012, next issue).  All of these terms imply a motivation that has not been tested in 
other species, that the interest in equity is based on an impulse for equity that is relatively 
permanent across contexts.  That is, my interest in fairness for myself should be based upon an 
interest in the ideal of fairness or equity, rather than on my own urge to maximize my own 
rewards, and moreover my interest in your outcomes should not differ (much) from my interest 
in my own.  This differs substantially from what is tested in animals. While we can study 
primates’ and other species’ interests in their outcomes relative to their partners’, what no one 
has yet done is determine whether these other species have an ideal of fairness that they strive to 
match, as humans appear to.  Thus in this paper, as with the others in these issues, we focus on 
aspects of fairness in other species, including how individuals respond to inequitable outcomes 
or inequitable levels of effort, but do not discuss fairness per se.   
Inequity comes in different forms (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Most inequity studies in 
nonhuman primate species focus on disadvantageous inequity (when another individual receives 
more than you), but advantageous inequity (when you receive more than another individual) is a 
second form of inequity studied in humans and, to a much lesser degree, non-humans. Another 
important consideration in terms of the response to variable rewards is the difference between 
social and individual expectations. The behavioral response may be influenced by violations of 
social expectations, based on what a partner receives compared to what the subject receives, or 
individual expectations, where an outcome differs from what is anticipated based on one’s own 
previous experiences. This contrast effect, in which an animal responds to the difference in what 
is currently available (generally a food item) versus what was received in a previous testing 
experience, may result in the same types of negative behavior as seen in social responses, or 
inequity. In fact, these contrast effects may even be part of the underlying mechanisms that 
produce behavioral responses to inequity. Thus, it is important to consider methodologies that 
distinguish social and non-social contexts.  
 In human studies, we can ask individuals how they feel to assess their responses to 
situations of inequity. In nonhuman primates, we can only measure overt behavioral responses. It 
is impossible to question them about their feelings in a certain context, and so scientists rely on 
how they react to assess an aversion to inequity. One common experimental testing procedure 
involves having animals complete a task with a human experimenter for a food reward. Two 
participants, one acting as a subject and the other as a partner, sit adjacent to one another in front 
of the experimenter and alternate participation.  This allows them to observe what tasks the other 
completes and what reward the other receives (c.f. Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). Thus, 
experimenters can vary the effort required for the task or the reward received in order to examine 
how subjects’ reactions change.  Generally, their response when the partner receives a better 
food reward is compared to the response in a baseline condition in which both individuals 
receive a lower-value food reward. In order to distinguish violations of social expectations (the 
inequity test) from violations of individual expectations, a control test can also be conducted to 
examine how subjects react when a high-value reward is explicitly offered, but neither individual 
receives it (e.g., Brosnan et al, 2010). Because we can only measure overt behaviors, a negative 
response to inequity is inferred through the frequency of refusals to exchange or refusing to 
consume the food reward.  
 Our goal is to understand the evolution of this response by examining this reaction across 
numerous primate species (and, ideally, non-primate species as well; see contributions in this 
volume by Range et al.; Horowitz; Raihani & McAuliffe; Pierce & Bekoff, 2012, this issue).  
Such analyses can help to inform us about why this behavior might exist. Similar responses 
across primate (or other) species may be explained either by homology or by convergence. Other 
possibilities may be that the response to inequity was an emergent property, representing a 
byproduct of sociality and cognition, or evolving with cooperative tendencies.  By comparing the 
patterning of these responses across multiple species, we can begin to understand the factors 
which led to its origin. 
2. SOCIO-ECOLOGY AND INEQUITY RESPONSES 
Although these behaviors must be studied across all species, the Primate Order represents 
a particularly good start. An investigation into the Primate Order provides insights into the 
evolution of human physiology, anatomy, and behavior, and also allows for comparison due to 
the diverse array of behaviors, social systems, and ecological adaptations across primate species. 
In fact, if there is a key shared feature amongst the primates, perhaps the best candidate is their 
cognitive and behavioral flexibility (Harlow, 1949).  There are a few hundred species of primates 
in the world today (the exact number is debated; Cowlishaw & Dunbar, 2000), geographically 
encompassing a wide range of regions and adapted to different types of habitats. Primates have 
the biology and physical structure to flourish in changing environments, including large, 
elaborate and highly-developed brains that help them adapt their behavior to suit their specific 
needs (Campbell et al., 2010). Moreover, the impressive cognitive abilities of these primate 
species make them ideal to study the evolution of cognition and intelligence (Byrne & Bates, 
2010; Reader et al., 2011; Rosati et al., 2010; Roth & Dicke, 2012; Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
While the diversity within this Order makes for a fascinating taxonomic group to study, it 
also provides a challenge for analyzing the evolution of characteristics and traits. Unlike physical 
characteristics, behavioral traits cannot be traced through fossil records. However, scientists can 
map out the origin and evolution of a behavior by looking at a phylogenetic tree within the 
Primate Order. This process involves comparing living species and determining phylogenetic 
relationships based on similarities or differences in traits; depending on which species share the 
trait, we can better determine whether the trait is shared through common descent (homology) or 
derived due to shared selective pressures (convergence; see Brosnan, 2012, this issue). In taking 
a phylogenetic approach to behavior, we must consider several factors unique to each species, 
such as ecology and social systems, before making a generalized comparison across species. For 
example, we may prematurely attribute a cognitive ability to being a byproduct of the high level 
of sociality observed in the species tested, until evidence of the same cognitive ability arises in 
one of the species that are less gregarious. This creates a challenge to researchers, as theories are 
constantly changing when confronted with emerging evidence from new research.  
This variability in behavior, sociality, and ecology across species also presents a 
challenge in a review, as critical characteristics may not be noted without a sufficient 
understanding of the species’ social and ecological environments.  Several factors within the 
socio-ecology of a species can provide clues as to the ecological importance of inequity and 
cooperation for each species. As cooperation requires the contribution of another individual, we 
should expect that larger social groups would provide more opportunities for individuals to 
cooperate; thus, increased sociality presumably requires a greater need to pay attention to the 
outcomes of other individuals in comparison to one’s own outcomes and keep track of these 
outcomes through repeated social interactions. Within social groups, the proportion of related 
and unrelated individuals may drive cooperation and aversion to inequity, since it is more 
adaptive for unrelated individuals to keep track of the behavior of a partner; unrelated individuals 
must determine whether to continue a cooperative relationship or find a different, more equitable 
partner in the face of inequity, while related individuals may be able to better tolerate 
disproportionate outcomes now and then due to potential benefits gained from inclusive fitness. 
Hierarchy may also have a large influence; the ranks of those individuals involved in a 
cooperative context may determine their expectations for outcomes in an inequitable situation.  
Moreover, there may be different hierarchies between the sexes. In addition to social factors, 
ecology may influence how prominent cooperation occurs in the wild. For example, certain types 
of prey require a group effort for hunting, and predation pressure may influence group defense 
mechanisms. The abundance or scarcity of resources affects food sharing, and other services may 
be exchanged in social settings, often requiring individuals to keep track of costs and benefits.   
On the other hand, a summary of the relevant features of the primates is a book’s worth 
of information in and of itself (see Campbell et al, 2010).  Thus, we limit ourselves to a few 
critical comments, rather than a comprehensive survey of each species or each relevant feature 
within the species we discuss.  Table 1 and the Appendix provide a summary of the social 
systems and ecologies of each of the species we discuss, as well as evidence in the field and in 
captivity of behaviors and complex cognitive abilities that relate to theories surrounding the 
inequity response, such as sharing tendencies and cooperative behavior. Table 2 provides data as 
known for each species’ responses to inequity in experimental tests. Given the format, this 
summary is necessarily brief, and given the relative recency with which this topic has been 
addressed, we have surely left out species for which data will shortly become available.  
Nonetheless, we hope that this is useful in placing even studies as yet unpublished into this 
context.  
3. HOW CONTEXT AFFECTS RESPONSES TO INEQUITY 
 The response to inequity involves and is affected by many different factors beyond each 
species’ ecology and social system, in particular the specific context of the situation. This may 
include social factors, such as rank, social closeness, and group structure as well as individual 
factors like personality, sex, age, and history.  Additionally, the methods used by experimenters 
to create an iniquitous situation may also shape expectations and resulting behavior. Therefore, 
within each inequity study, the specific context must be carefully considered in the interpretation 
of results. 
3.1 Effort 
 Amongst humans, effort is important in how people perceive fairness. More effort 
expended is typically assumed to require more reward at the other end (Lawrence & Festinger, 
1962); if I work just as hard as you, but get less reward, I am likely to be dissatisfied.  However, 
it is unclear whether this is also the case in other species. Most studies find that changing the 
levels of effort do not change subjects’ responses (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Fontenot et al., 2007).  
At most, they have amplified the effects of inequity, causing stronger reactions when both 
rewards and effort were unequal (van Wolkenten et al., 2007). One recent study, however, 
indicates that effort, too, can be important. In capuchins, a subject operating a pull-drawer device 
was significantly more likely to provide a high-value reward to a conspecific recipient, 
regardless of social rank, when that recipient helped the subject operate the device (in essence 
providing equal labor). However, when the subject had to do all of the work (unequal labor), 
food sharing was not influenced by the presence or rank of the recipient (Takimoto & Fujita, 
2011).  
A second question is whether effort, as defined as the presence of a task, is necessary to 
elicit a response. Initial studies all included a task (e.g., Brosnan & de Waal, 2003), but 
subsequent studies often eliminated the task and just compared subjects’ responses when final 
outcomes varied (e.g., food rewards were handed out for free; Bräuer et al., 2006; Dindo & de 
Waal, 2007; Roma et al., 2006; see also Bräuer & Hanus, 2012, next issue).  In none of these 
studies did subjects show any response to different rewards, and circumstantial evidence began 
to accrue that a task was essential. For instance, in the same group of capuchin monkeys, the 
monkeys responded negatively in two different studies involving a task (Brosnan & de Waal, 
2003; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), yet between these studies, showed no response to a situation 
that did not include a task (Dindo & de Waal, 2007).  However, the tasks and foods varied 
between these studies, and they were run by different researchers at different times, making 
direct comparisons impossible.  Since then, several studies have more rigorously tested this 
proposition. Neiworth et al. (2009) tested tamarins on a between subjects design, but kept all 
other aspects of the study the same between the different groups. Although neither group 
responded negatively to inequity, they found that subjects in the exchange condition overall 
refused food items more often than those who were not. Brosnan and colleagues have used a 
within-subjects design in several species. When effort and no-effort conditions involving the 
same outcomes were randomized, chimpanzees responded negatively to conditions with a task, 
but not to a no-effort “gift” condition (Brosnan et al., 2010b).  Moreover, as with Neiworth et 
al.’s findings, even in species that do not respond to inequity, there is typically a greater 
frequency of refusals in exchange conditions than in the “gift” conditions without a task (squirrel 
monkeys: Talbot et al., 2011; marmosets; Freeman et al., in review; orangutans, Brosnan et al., 
2011a).  
It is not clear why this is the case. As a first possibility, studies testing the negative 
response to inequity involve captive animals, who regularly receive food provisioned by human 
caretakers. Food is often distributed unequally, based on need or rank, and some individuals may 
be accustomed to getting more (or less). Captive animals may come to learn that there is no point 
in protesting food being handed out for “free.” Second, it may be that the presence of a task is 
what cues the subject to a context in which sensitivity to inequity is important (Brosnan et al, 
2010; Brosnan, 2011). That is, if one purpose of inequity aversion is to help individuals 
recognize and avoid those situations in which a partner is receiving a greater benefit for a joint 
interaction (e.g., cooperation), then inequity aversion is far more important in contexts in which 
there has been joint interaction than those in which there has not.  Although the procedure itself 
is not joint, in the sense that the two individuals’ outcomes do not rely on each other, it may be 
that the presence of two actions completed in such close succession indicates to the animals a 
joint task. This may cause individuals to respond differently in trials with a task than in those 
“gift reward” situations in which no task is present. Further work is needed to fully understand 
how effort and reward are interrelated in subjects’ perception of inequity. 
3.2 Social factors 
 Social factors, such as sex and rank, have shown quite varied effects. This is rather 
surprising, as presumably individuals who are more used to getting the best rewards (that is, 
dominants, who also are, in most primate species, males), would be more sensitive to the 
inequities generated by these studies, given that they typically get the most and the best of 
everything. That being said, both rank (Bräuer, et al., 2006; Brosnan, et al., 2010b) and sex 
(Brosnan et al, 2010b) effects have been found in chimpanzees, with both dominants and males 
being more likely to respond to inequity. In the capuchin study discussed earlier, in which 
capuchins could pull in a drawer to bring each other food, inequity in the reward distribution 
depended on an interplay of rank and the presence or absence of visual contact (Takimoto et al., 
2010). Finally, dominant long-tailed macaques, but not subordinates, react to inequity (Massen et 
al., 2011b).  
Although social influences are emerging, the nature of the test may mask these to some 
degree.  For instance, responses may be directed at the experimenter (who caused the inequity) 
rather than the partner.  In most studies, the experimenter causes the inequity, but in one study in 
which individuals had to work out their rewards amongst themselves, capuchins were more 
sensitive to their partners’ behavior than to the reward distribution (Brosnan et al., 2006).  A 
more direct relationship between task completion and reward payoff may uncover more 
consistent social effects. Additionally, new studies which remove or lessen the presence of the 
experimenter may help unravel this question. 
Moreover, it may be that we are investigating the wrong social factors.  Studies of 
collaboration find that what really seems to matter is the relationship between the individuals 
involved (Melis et al., 2006).  With respect to inequity, Brosnan et al. (2005) found differences 
between chimpanzee groups, such that individuals in a long-term, well-established social group 
showed less of a response to inequity, while individuals in a short-term group showed a stronger 
reaction, suggesting that social closeness and tolerance may influence the reaction to inequity. 
These results fit the broader perspective of group behavior; long-term social groups have 
demonstrated high levels of reciprocity in terms of sharing food and grooming (de Waal, 1997a), 
and show reconciliation after fights (Preuschoft et al., 2002) while avoiding confrontation (Hare 
et al., 2000). Thus, it makes sense that inequity responses would be stronger in situations in 
which groups were unstable or relationships were forming, as individuals presumably have more 
of a need to assess their partners’ trustworthiness.   Future studies including tolerance 
(acceptance of strains and imbalances in a relationship) may provide some answers, at the levels 
of the individual (e.g. individuals with an overall more tolerant personality), relationship (e.g., 
increased male tolerance towards a female with a swollen sexual swelling that is more attractive) 
and group (e.g., groups with more tolerant, stable interactions). 
3.3 Methodology  
 Methodology may play a large role in the variability of the response to inequity both 
between and within species. First, there are inevitably limitations regarding the set-up in social 
arrangement of nonhuman primate subjects in a captive research setting. Researchers must work 
around the infrastructure of the facilities, which vary in terms of the size of shared space for a 
group of animals, the number of available cages for individual separation, the number of access 
points to other areas, and so forth. In addition, the overall behavior of a species may influence 
social arrangement; whereas chimpanzees can be trained to calmly sit next to one another, other 
species are naturally much more frenetic and may require separation to facilitate a more 
controlled methodology and to prevent stealing of rewards or tokens between subjects. Within a 
species, there are social concerns and limitations. Some individuals may not get along as well 
with others, and this must be taken into consideration, limiting available pairings, and restricting 
data to only those individuals who have more tolerant relationships (see above). There are really 
two separate issues here. The first is the degree to which different results are explicable by 
different methodological practices. The second is the degree to which these behaviors may be 
influenced by the very fact of captivity. 
Regarding methodological practices, small differences in experimental protocols, such as 
how the subjects are seated with respect to one another, may make big differences in response. 
Takimoto et al. (2010) found behavioral differences in capuchins based on visual contact, which 
suggests that any sense of separation, either visually or physically, affects behavior. 
Additionally, whether individuals are seated next to one another in a shared enclosure (Brosnan 
et al., 2005; 2010b) or across from one another in separate enclosures (Bräuer et al., 2006; 2009) 
may play a role.  In humans, the orientation of the subjects has proven important (Sommer, 
1967).  However, this is something that is often beyond the control of researchers, particularly 
with large species such as the great apes, who cannot easily be moved in to different 
arrangements (and may not always affect behavior; Silk et al., 2005). 
Regarding the impact of captivity, psychology is constantly concerned with how 
experiments are affected by the very artificiality of the procedures. Do individuals respond as 
they perceive the experimenters desire?  Are their behaviors influenced by the set-up in ways 
that human experimenters may not recognize?  If, for instance, subjects are separated into 
individual enclosures and can only interact through mesh or a barrier, more natural behavior that 
may be important to social interactions, such as grooming or begging, may be prevented.  
Additionally, unwanted behavior, such as stealing of rewards, is prevented (in fact, the barrier 
may have been implemented to prevent just that!). Also, artifacts of daily husbandry practice 
may affect behavior in these studies, as discussed above with respect to food distribution.  
Finally, experiments vary in their degree of control, and experimenters should take care to 
balance highly controlled but potentially more artificial studies with those that are less 
controlled, but potentially more natural.  In this way we get the best of both worlds; sufficient 
control to tease apart mechanisms and causality, but a “reality check” to verify the 
appropriateness of the results to the species.  Of course, this is not to say that any of these studies 
are irrelevant, any more than it would be appropriate to say studies on humans are irrelevant for 
their reliance on artificial procedures or foci on limited subsets of the human population.  Often, 
the only way to conduct a study that is sufficiently controlled to enable the dissection of causality 
and underlying mechanisms is to use a very controlled experiment in the laboratory. 
Nonetheless, researchers should pay careful attention to differences in housing and husbandry to 
consider whether these methodological concerns may be affecting responses in experimental 
tests. 
3.4 Delay of gratification  
Of course, cognitive factors that vary between species may also influence mechanisms.  
While a discussion of all of these possible cognitive factors is beyond the scope of this paper (see 
Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012, this issue and Yamamoto & Takimoto, 2012 in the subsequent issue 
for further discussion of some relevant cognitive factors), we do discuss one that we think is 
quite important, and understudied, in relation to inequity.  In order for an animal to refuse a 
reward as a means of displaying displeasure, they must be able to control impulses, or delay 
gratification.  Animals vary in their ability to do so. While many animals prefer immediacy of 
reward (Abeyesinghe et al., 2005; Mazur, 1987; Richards et al., 1997), several of the primate 
species are able to delay gratification for very long periods of time.  Many of the species we 
discuss can do so, including chimpanzees, capuchins, and rhesus and long-tailed macaques 
(Beran & Evans, 2006; Dufour et al., 2007; Evans & Westergaard, 2006; Evans & Beran, 2007a, 
2007b; Szalda-Petree et al., 2004; Tobin et al., 1996). Chimpanzees can delay for up to 11 
minutes, and use self-distraction to facilitate this delay (Beran & Evans, 2006; Evans & Beran, 
2007b). Tamarins and marmosets are also able to delay in specific contexts that are related to 
their species-specific ecologies (Stevens et al., 2005).   Such ecological specificity may indicate 
specificity in other areas, too, such as in social contexts related to cooperation and inequity. 
Considering this, then, it may not be surprising that the list of species with noted delay of 
gratification abilities are also the species that show behavioral responses to inequity (although 
we hasten to point out that not all of the species tested for inequity have been tested for delay of 
gratification, and some species that can delay gratification do not show behavioral responses to 
inequity).  Turning down an immediate food reward is clearly challenging for most species, and 
not something that they will easily do even for a potentially greater payoff in the future.  
However, if the hypothesis that individuals’ tendency to do so is related to cooperation is correct, 
then a negative response to inequity may involve expectations about what an individual will, 
should, or could receive in the near future.  That is, it is possible that animals reject the 
immediate food based on the possibility of increased payoffs in the future.  This is similar to 
delay of gratification, albeit with a far less certain future outcome, thus the act of refusing may 
be scaffolded by the individual’s ability to delay gratification.  Note of course that this does not 
mean that the animals must understand this chain of logic, but that the ability to delay 
gratification may open up opportunities for refusing that would not exist otherwise, thus 
providing selective pressures which increase species’ abilities in this area.  We also note one 
very speculative possibility, which is that one reason subjects may be better able to refuse in the 
context of a task than when simply handed foods could be the presence of an object (e.g., a 
token) with which to play.  This may help individuals to distract themselves from the temptation 
of returning the reward (e.g., Evans & Beran, 2007a).  It will be interesting to see how various 
cognitive mechanisms influence individuals’ ability to respond to inequity. 
5.  THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUITY  
Primate species vary widely in their responses to inequity, which seems to eliminate the 
possibility that the inequity response is a homology shared amongst the primates (see Table 2). 
Moreover, the variability does not even suggest homology within smaller clusters, such as the 
great apes. For instance, amongst the great apes, there is evidence for a negative response to 
inequity in humans and chimpanzees, and possibly in bonobos, but not in orangutans (gorillas 
have not yet been tested using a similar protocol).  Amongst the New World monkeys, in the 
Family Cebidae, capuchin monkeys respond negatively to inequity, but not the very closely 
related squirrel monkey.  Thus, based on these data, the inequity response is almost certainly a 
convergent trait. But, which traits are those which led to the emergence of inequity aversion?  
Although the data are messy, some patterns are beginning to emerge.  Below we discuss several 
traits that seem likely candidates, and consider whether or not they deserve additional attention 
as possible links to the evolution of inequity. 
 One possibility that we seem to be able to rule out is that the response to inequity varies 
as a function of cognitive abilities or brain size within the primates.  Presumably this comparison 
requires some basic cognitive abilities (e.g., those necessary to compare one’s outcome with 
another conspecific’s), but the data indicate that within the primates, neither absolute brain size 
(Deaner et al., 2007) nor brain-to-body ratio (Jerison, 1973; Martin, 1984), correlate with 
inequity responses.  Within the great apes, which have comparatively similar brain sizes, 
orangutans do not respond to inequity (Bräuer et al., 2009; Brosnan et al., 2011a), thus a large 
brain is not sufficient to respond to inequity.  Additionally, while both capuchins and macaques 
show negative responses to inequity, capuchins are highly encephalized, but macaques are not 
(Martin, 1984). This latter point rules out the possibility that a large brain-to-body ratio is 
necessary (although absolute brain size may play a role).  Future testing in species that share 
other important traits in common with primates (e.g., cooperation; see Raihani et al., 2012, this 
volume) but lack the high degree of encephalization will be essential to distinguish these 
possibilities.  
Another very reasonable assumption, particularly if the response to inequity is considered 
to have a social origin and requires paying attention to what another receives, is that it should 
relate to social living, and thus be more prevalent in gregarious species. That is, individuals in 
social groups with strong bonds should be more inclined to be aware of and react to the behavior 
and outcomes of others as compared to their own. However, while the data thus far support the 
prediction that only species that are habitually socially living show the response, social living in 
itself is not sufficient to predict the response.  Squirrel monkeys, a socially living species that 
shares a phylogenetic family with capuchins, and are even sympatric with them (e.g., live in the 
same habitat), do not respond to inequity, nor do species that exhibit bi-parental care, which live 
in close-knit family groups and for whom the mated pair show a high degree of interdependence.  
We also note that this cannot be explained by sociality combined with tolerance.  Not only do 
results suggest that species with bi-parental care and squirrel monkeys fail to respond to inequity, 
but macaques, which live in a society that is not as tolerant and involves a very strict hierarchy, 
do respond negatively to inequity.  
Thus far, the existing evidence best supports the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity 
emerged in concert with cooperative behavior between unrelated individuals. They may be 
directly linked, in which case attending to and responding to inequity may function to increase 
the success of long-term cooperative relationships (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Brosnan, 2006; 
2011). Considering the apes, orangutans show the lowest frequency of cooperation in the wild 
(although they do cooperate in lab-based studies), while chimpanzees are highly cooperative 
both in the wild and in captivity (see Table 1 for references).  This hypothesis is further 
supported in the New World monkeys; squirrel monkeys are much less cooperative than 
capuchins and also do not respond negatively to inequity. Finally, the macaques, which are 
socially cooperative, also show a response to inequity.  
Moreover, studies that have looked at inequity in the context of a cooperative interaction 
support this hypothesis.  For instance, pairs of capuchin monkeys were much more successful in 
a cooperative task when they alternated which individual received the better reward (Brosnan et 
al., 2006; Hattori et al., 2005). This inclination to accept short-term costs (not receiving a good 
reward for a trial) for long-term gains (a balanced strategy to maximize benefits to both 
individuals) may aid in establishing cooperative relationships in the future.  This may be 
essential for the development of cooperation, as typically rewards are not perfectly equitably 
distributed on each trial (or interaction), but only over the course of the pairs’ interactions. These 
data also may indicate that in non-human species, the inequity response could serve as a 
commitment device, in which individuals accept short-term losses in order to establish more 
beneficial long-term relationships (e.g., Frank, 1988). Moreover, the negative response to 
inequity may be especially important in unrelated individuals compared to related individuals; 
inclusive fitness and increased tolerance in individuals that are related may promote cooperation 
and thus, lead to a decreased sensitivity to inequity. Therefore, it may not be adaptive for related 
individuals to keep track of and respond to inequities, since commitment to cooperation is 
already present in the inclusive fitness benefits. 
We also note one additional piece of the puzzle.  An inconsistency is observed in the 
cooperative breeders, in which both males and females, often with adult offspring, care for 
infants.  This social system leads to fitness interdependence between the males and females.  
According to the cooperative breeding hypothesis (Burkart et al., 2009; Hrdy, 2009), this unique 
social system, characterized by extreme social tolerance and cooperation, ranging from food 
sharing to caring for infants, has led to the evolution of enhanced prosocial behavior as compared 
to other primates. It is possible that this interdependence may also lead to a changed inequity 
response.  That is, despite strongly cooperative behavior, males and females rely on each other 
for reproductive fitness.  Thus, minor breaches in equity may be tolerated since the costs of 
finding a new partner would outweigh the costs of the inequitable interaction.  This hypothesis 
deserves further testing, both among cooperative breeders and among monogamous species with 
shared parental duties (e.g., owl monkeys; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2001), for whom breeding 
adults may share similar selective pressures as do cooperative breeders (Brosnan, 2011; Freeman 
et al, in review). 
7. Future directions 
 The studies discussed have made great contributions to understanding the evolution of the 
response to inequity, at least amongst primates (for a phylogenetically broader view, see Pierce 
& Bekoff; Raihani & McAuliffe; Horowitz; Range et al., all 2012, this issue). Based on the 
amount of variability between and within different species, more research will be required to 
confirm and expand on past results. Changes in methodology can provide a new perspective, and 
different contexts should continue to be explored, especially due to the scarcity of data on the 
effect of social factors.  
For instance, how important are tangible food rewards in eliciting a response?  Do these 
responses translate to other types of rewards?  There is evidence of attention to inequity during 
play behavior in gorillas (van Leeuwen et al., 2011), but other more experimental studies up to 
this point have only used food as a reward.  However, an abstract representation of food (e.g., 
tokens) could replace actual food rewards to determine the influence of visible and tangible food 
rewards on the response to inequity. Primates are certainly capable of using tokens to represent 
foods for these sorts of tasks (Addessi et al., 2007; Addessi & Rossi, 2011; Brosnan & de Waal, 
2004a; Brosnan & de Waal, 2004b; Sousa & Matsuzawa, 2001).  We predict diminished negative 
responses with tokens as compared to tasks with tangible foods, but also that individuals that 
have had greater experience with token tasks should show stronger responses to inequity, due to 
their increased experience (e.g., Brosnan et al., 2011b). In addition, it would be interesting to 
explore other types of biologically relevant rewards (e.g., other than foods or tokens representing 
foods) that might elicit the negative response to inequity.   
It will also be intriguing to explore how new methodologies that minimize the interaction 
between the subjects and the experimenter might affect responses towards a social partner. For 
example, using an automatic token or food dispenser would diminish human interaction and 
might make the behavior of the conspecific more salient, while also removing the “free gift” 
association with rewards that often arises in captivity with food provisioning and training (Price 
and Brosnan, in prep).  Future research should also take in to account social factors that have not 
yet been studied.  For instance, it would be interesting to consider fluctuating social influences, 
such as the reproductive state of the females. Male chimpanzees may show a preference for 
females that are in estrus, through grooming (Hemelrijk et al., 1992), which peaks during the 
onset of swelling (Wallis, 1992). Therefore, males might be more tolerant of a female benefiting 
from a better reward (and thus, will be less likely to show a response to inequity) when she is 
maximally swollen or otherwise reflects being in a state of estrus.  Related to this, what are the 
impacts of an observer on inequity aversion?  Eavesdropping affects behavior in many species 
(e.g. Marshall-Pescini et al., 2011), and might do so in the context of inequity as well.  Finally, 
other factors such as practice or experience may play a role in affecting these responses. 
Finally, our exploration of these topics needs to extend further.  First, without studies that 
examine these responses in the animals’ natural lives to supplement what can be inferred by 
studies in captivity, we will not fully understand how they impact behavior (Janson & Brosnan, 
in press). Second, without a broader phylogenetic perspective, we will not fully understand the 
evolution of this response.  Regarding the first, there is very little data on how individuals 
respond to inequity in their typical interactions (see Bekoff, 2004, for an exception).  How do 
inequity responses impact animals’ daily decision-making and behavior?  These sorts of issues 
are difficult to address in field settings, as behavior now may be impacted by events that 
occurred months or even years in the past, but the data may be available at long-term field sites 
or other situations with extensive data collection.  Regarding the need for a broader phylogenetic 
perspective, there has been the welcome addition of data from other phylogenetic taxa (see 
Pierce & Bekoff; Raihani & McAuliffe; Horowitz; Range et al., all 2012, this issue), and these 
data will help us tease apart how the factors we discuss are important outside of the primates.  
Without studying species that vary in social structure, cognitive ability, and cooperation, as well 
as other behaviors, it is impossible to answer questions about the relative importance of each of 
these factors in the origins of this response.   
8. CONCLUSION 
The comparative study of the response to inequity can help us understand the evolution of 
this behavior. Thus far, data suggest that this is a convergent trait that most likely co-evolved 
with cooperative behavior. How do these results in other species, particularly the non-human 
primates, inform us about human fairness and justice (see Chen & Houser; Skitka; Christen & 
Glock; Olson; Brosnan & de Waal, 2012, next issue)?  In some ways, this still seems to be quite 
a challenge.  The concept of “fairness” in humans is much more complex than what we have 
seen thus far in non-humans, incorporating advantageous inequity and disadvantageous inequity 
as well as cultural norms that impact how humans respond to each other. In human society, 
fairness is treated as a norm (albeit one that varies across cultures), and there are certain 
standards that are understood by all within a group as those by which all actions are to be judged. 
Responses in non-humans appear thus far to be focused on the individual’s outcome as compared 
to a partner, not as compared to some standard of fairness, indicating differences between 
humans and other species, and potentially limiting the value of such comparisons.   
On the other hand, there are clearly commonalities.  Both humans and other species are 
more sensitive to inequities against themselves (e.g., disadvantageous inequity aversion) than 
those in other contexts.  Moreover, there are other features in common, such as the impact of 
social factors on such reactions.  Finally, at the practical level, far less is known about other 
species than is known about humans.  There have been far fewer studies, and frequently 
procedures are not comparable across species, particularly between humans and non-humans, 
making such comparisons challenging.  Thus it is unknown the degree to which this difference 
may hold, and future research is needed to more carefully pin down the similarities and 
differences.  Of course, at the broadest level, the roots of this human behavior are seen in other 
species.  A better understanding of these evolutionary roots, including the ways in which humans 
do or do not differ from other species, can inform our understanding of human fairness, and 
provide a greater understanding of how this important trait affects a wide variety of human 
endeavors.   
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 Table 1: An overview of the primate species and their defining socio-ecological features. 
Geography includes geographical locations and types of habitat. Social organization includes 
composition of social units. Group size includes size of immediate social unit and communities, 
and stability of these units. Despotism describes a social organization with a strict dominance 
hierarchy. Foraging style describes the type of diet; omnivores eat plants and animals, folivores 
primarily eat plants, and frugivores primarily eat fruit. The presence of meat in the diet is 
indicated, which may also involve hunting behavior. Sharing food refers to active sharing 
between two or more individuals, both naturally in the wild based on observations as well as in 
experimental setups in the laboratory. Cooperation refers to two or more individuals working 
together, both naturally in the wild based on observations as well as in experimental setups in 
the laboratory. EQ (encephalization quotient) is a measurement of relative brain size (ratio 
between actual brain mass and predicted brain mass depending on the size of the animal), and is 
often used as an estimate of intelligence. 
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Table 2: Summary of inequity studies by species. An indication of whether inequity has been 
found in that species is provided. If inequity has been found in a species, the specific methods 
used are indicated; exchange task refers to procedures described in section 1, other task refers 
to a task that does not involve an exchange, and no task refers to the absence of any physical 
task that needs to be performed. Evidence of different effects on the response to inequity are 
indicated; effort refers to differences in the effort required to solve a task, and social context 
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1.  Chimpanzees 
 Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are great apes, and one of our two closest living relatives 
(along with bonobos, Pan paniscus). Chimpanzees are highly social, living in large fission-
fusion groups with complex social relationships and strong dominance hierarchies  (de Waal, 
1989; Harcourt & Waal, 1992). Males are philopatric and remain in their natal social 
communities, forming strong social bonds, while females emigrate when they reach adolescence. 
Chimpanzees also cooperate, for instance in territorial patrols (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 
2000) or when hunting in groups (Boesch, 1994; Mitani & Watts, 2001). Although food sharing 
is in general rare outside of mothers and offspring (Goodall, 1986; Silk, 1978; although see 
Preutz & Lindshield, 2011), meat sharing occurs (Goodall, 1986; Nishida et al., 1992), often in 
return for agonistic support (Mitani & Watts, 2001) or mating opportunities (Gomes & Boesch, 
2009). Males may also share hard-to-get cultivated fruits with females (Hockings et al., 2007). 
The wide range of tolerant, cooperative behavior in the wild suggests that chimpanzees are aware 
of each other’s behaviors and the distribution of payoffs received through these interactions. 
Chimpanzees also show a number of behaviors indicative that they pay attention to the 
equity of distributions.  For instance, in laboratory cooperation studies, in which individuals must 
work together to acquire rewards, chimpanzees who were working for a single reward that must 
be shared were far more likely to succeed with a partner with whom they otherwise tolerantly 
share food (Melis et al, 2006b), and actively recruited the more tolerant partner (Melis et al., 
2006a). Chimpanzees also were able to coordinate their responses in a Stag Hunt game such that 
both individuals achieved the highest reward, although this ability seemed to interact with 
experience, with chimpanzees with a more extensive history of testing outperforming those with 
less such experience (Brosnan et al., 2011b).  
Chimpanzees also respond to inequity in experimental studies (following the exchange 
procedure described in the main body of the text), although responses vary widely, based on 
factors that are not yet well understood.  For instance, chimpanzees’ responses have varied 
between facilities, even when an identical protocol was used (Brosnan et al., 2005; 2010b).  
Within the same facility, responses have varied based on the quality of individuals’ relationships 
(Brosnan et al., 2005), sex, and rank (Brosnan, et al., 2010b), with male and dominant 
chimpanzees responding more negatively to inequity than females and subordinates (when tested 
in same-sex pairs). These results seem to fit chimpanzee socioecology; males form much closer 
bonds, through coalitions and alliances often associated with hunting and patrolling, and 
therefore may be more sensitive to differing outcomes, while females spend most of their time 
foraging alone or with offspring, and so may be more focused on individual expectations.  
Additionally, high-ranking individuals may be more accustomed to receiving a better share of a 
distribution or a better quality food resource.  However, what is important to remember is that 
this is not always consistent across sites and protocols; sometimes sex and rank differences are 
seen, but other times they are not  (Brosnan et al., 2010b; Brosnan et  al., 2005; Bräuer et al., 
2006; Bräuer et al., 2009).  Additionally, even the orientation of the subjects to each other in the 
experimental set-up appears to make a difference in their responses (Brosnan et al, 2010b).  
Thus, future work is needed to understand how this variation affects responses, and what this 
tells us about the evolution of inequity responses. 
2. Bonobos 
 Bonobos (Pan paniscus) differ from chimpanzees in their social structure. Bonobo 
society is more female-centered, female-dominant, and egalitarian (de Waal, 1995). Males are 
philopatric and remain in their natal group, while females migrate around adolescence (Idani, 
1991; Kano, 1982). Female bonobos have much stronger bonds compared to males, and bonobo 
females can cooperatively dominate males (Kano, 1992; Parish, 1994, 1996). Bonobos have been 
observed in the wild and captivity sharing both plants and meat (de Waal, 1992; Hohmann & 
Fruth, 1993; White, 1994), and may exchange food for mating access (Kuroda, 1984), although 
recent evidence indicates that chimpanzees may actually be more tolerant sharers (Jaeggi et al., 
2010). Bonobos have also cooperated in captive experiments, and in such studies were more 
successful than chimpanzees when food sources were monopolizable (Hare et al., 2007). Only 
one study has tested the inequity response in bonobos, and although individuals refused rewards 
twice as often when their partner got a better reward than when they got the same, lower-value 
reward, the result was not statistically significant, possibly due to the small sample size (Bräuer, 
et al., 2009).  
3. Gorillas 
Gorillas (genus Gorilla) live in harems comprised of one adult male (silverback), 
multiple adult females with their offspring, and sometimes other males (Harcourt, 1978; 
Robbins, 1995). The silverback has strong bonds with his females (Harcourt, 1979a) but bonds 
between females vary, ranging from friendly to aggressive interactions (Harcourt, 1979b). In the 
wild, female gorillas have been observed cooperating and forming alliances in competition over 
food resources and to protect relatives from harm (Harcourt & Stewart, 2007; Watts, 1997). 
Although food sharing is rarely reported in the wild, gorillas have demonstrated food sharing in 
captivity (Maestripieri et al., 2002; Schaller, 1963).  Unfortunately, there is as yet very little 
captive research on social cognition in gorillas, although one recent study investigating responses 
to inequities during play fighting (Van Leeuwen et al., 2011) found that individuals worked to 
maintain inequities in their favor (e.g., running away after hitting, apparently so that the 
competitive advantage could be maintained). Future work on gorillas is needed to complete our 
understanding of the great apes. 
4. Orangutans 
 Orangutans (Genus Pongo) are great apes that, in the wild, have a more solitary lifestyle 
compared to the other great apes. Although home ranges overlap (Galdikas, 1988), orangutans 
other than mother-offspring dyads spend most of their time alone (MacKinnon, 1974).  
Nonetheless, groups of orangutans may travel together, or feed together when fruit is abundant, 
and in captivity, orangutans show increased social behavior (Edwards & Snowdon, 1980). Based 
on research in the wild, food sharing among orangutans is rare (Bard, 1992; Jaeggi et al., 2008; 
van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 2009). Also, unlike other apes in the wild, orangutans form 
coalitions and alliances to a lesser degree (van Schaik, 2004). However, the lack of cooperative 
behavior may again be due to limited opportunities, not limited abilities. In captivity, orangutans 
have both solved cooperative tasks to achieve food (Chalmeau et al., 1997) and traded tokens 
reciprocally to receive mutual benefits (Dufour et al., 2009). Despite this, however, orangutans 
did not show negative responses to inequity (Bräuer, et al., 2009; Brosnan, et al., 2011a).  
5. Macaques 
 Macaques (genus Macaca) are Old World monkeys, and include two species that have 
received attention in inequity studies, rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) and long-tailed 
macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Macaques are social, living in large, multi-male, multi-female 
groups, but tend to be despotic, with low social tolerance, and frequently use aggression to 
establish and reinforce social position in the asymmetrical dominance hierarchy (Smuts et al., 
1987; Thierry, 2000). Although macaques are not known to cooperatively share food, or to 
successfully cooperate in experimental studies (Petit et al., 1992), they demonstrate other forms 
of cooperative behavior in the wild. Long-tailed macaques form alliances in aggressive contexts 
(de Waal, 1977; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 1985), reciprocate grooming to decrease 
aggression (Gumert & Ho, 2008), and exchange grooming for access to sexually active females, 
infant handling, and support (Gumert, 2007a, 2007b; Massen, 2010). Female rhesus macaques 
show cooperative behavior (grooming and agonistic aid) towards kin (Widdig et al., 2001). 
Possibly connected to this, long-tailed macaques have shown prosocial behavior in the 
laboratory, choosing options that bring food to their partners (Massen et al., 2010).  However, in 
most cases prosocial behavior was limited to female kin pairs or the dominant member of the 
pair, the latter of which may have been an attempt to curry favor with the subordinate.  In fact, 
rank predicted prosocial sharing better than did relationship quality (Massen, et al., 2011a). 
Related to this, dominant long-tailed macaques showed responses to inequity when the level of 
effort required was small (Massen et al, 2011b).  As with long –tailed macaques, rhesus monkeys 
coordinated in a Stag Hunt game (Brosnan et al., 2011c), and also have responded negatively to 
inequity, although only once they have reached approximately two years of age (Hopper et al., in 
review). 
 6. Capuchin monkeys 
Brown capuchins (genus Cebus) are New World monkeys that live in small groups 
comprised of related females with offspring and several males.  Capuchin society is rather 
tolerant (Fragaszy et al., 2004); capuchins both share food (Perry & Rose, 1994) and cooperate, 
including cooperative hunting (Rose, 1997), defense against predators (Boinski, 1988; Rose, 
1994), and coalitions against neighboring groups (Gros-Louis et al., 2003). These coalitions are 
especially interesting because, unlike chimpanzee males, who form strong bonds and who often 
form coalitions for aggressive purposes, capuchin males are not philopatric and do not form 
close affiliative bonds (Perry, 1998).   
Capuchins have been widely used in cooperative studies, which have confirmed that they 
are aware of the contingencies of cooperation, including the role of a partner, the effort required, 
and the distribution of outcomes (see Brosnan, 2010 for review). Capuchins have also shared 
food (de Waal, 1997), and after successful cooperative trials, the amount of food shared 
increased (de Waal & Berger, 2000). On the other hand, in the Stag Hunt game, capuchins 
showed the least structured coordination behavior compared to humans, rhesus and chimpanzees, 
and apparently require cues in order to be able to coordinate (Brosnan, et al., 2011b; Brosnan, et 
al., 2011c). Capuchins have also demonstrated prosocial preferences, which seem to be affected 
by dominance rank or social closeness with the partner, whether or not they can see the partner, 
and reward distribution (de Waal et al., 2008; Takimoto et al., 2010).  They have even brought 
their partner more food than they received (Brosnan et al., 2010a; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 
2008).   
Several studies have confirmed a negative response by an individual when unequal 
distributions resulted in a partner receiving a better reward (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan, 
et al., 2010a; Fletcher, 2008; Takimoto, et al., 2010; Van Wolkenten et al., 2007).They have also 
been sensitive to the effort required to perform the task, at least in some contexts (Hattori et al., 
2005, but see Fontenot et al., 2007; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).  Finally, individuals who were 
working together for rewards were more sensitive to their partners’ behavior than to their 
outcomes, continuing to cooperate as long as both partners received the superior reward 
sometimes (Brosnan et al., 2006).  This latter study demonstrated that they could extrapolate 
rewards across multiple trials, presumably an essential ability given that cooperative encounters 
do not result in equal outcomes on every trial.   
7. Squirrel monkeys 
 Squirrel monkeys (genus Saimiri) share both a phylogenetic Family and a similar ecology 
with capuchins, but differ in their social structure and behavior (Boinski, 1999). Most 
importantly for this discussion, they demonstrate only limited cooperative behavior in the wild.  
Adult females with neonates will cooperate in anti-predator vigilance and defense (Boinski, 
1987), and males form coalitions in order to immigrate into a new group (Boinski, 1999; 
Mitchell, 1994). Squirrel monkeys have not been tested experimentally for cooperative behavior, 
but did show reduced food sharing behavior, except when harassed by a partner (Stevens, 2004). 
Squirrel monkeys also did not respond negatively to inequity (Talbot et al., 2011).  
8. Tamarins 
 Tamarins (genus Saguinus) are cooperatively breeding New World monkeys that live in 
groups in which, typically, only a single female is reproductively active (Sussman & Garber, 
1987). Cooperation is vital in tamarin societies; data from the field and captivity have 
demonstrated that infant survival is directly related to number of caretakers present (Garber et 
al., 1984; Savage et al., 1996; Snowdon, 1996). Food sharing is also common. Field studies show 
that food sharing is used to help the young locate and obtain prey that may be hard to acquire, 
and this food sharing decreases as the young become more competent (Rapaport & Ruiz-
Miranda, 2002; Rapaport, 2006). Studies in captivity reinforce tamarins’ tendencies to share food 
(Cronin et al., 2005; Cronin & Snowdon, 2008; Feistner & Price, 1999, 2000; Price & Feistner, 
2001; Rapaport, 1999). Data conflict on whether tamarins are prosocial (Cronin et al., 2009; 
Cronin et al., 2010; Stevens, 2010). Tamarins showed little evidence of an inequity response, 
although they were more likely to respond negatively to a lower-value reward when any effort 
was involved (Neiworth et al., 2009).  
9.  Marmosets 
 Marmosets (genus Callithrix) are also New World monkeys that are in many ways 
similar to tamarins (they share a phylogenetic Family and are also cooperative breeders; Koenig, 
1995; Sussman & Garber, 1987). Marmosets tend to share food in the wild (Brown et al., 2004; 
Goldizen, 1987) and in captivity (Brown et al., 2005). Group territorial defense is also common 
(Lazaro-Perea, 2001). In experimental studies, marmosets demonstrated cooperative behavior 
that depended on the distribution of roles in a cooperative task as well as the tolerance of high-
ranking individuals (Werdenich & Huber, 2002) and prosocial behavior (Burkart et al., 2007). 
However, marmosets were not sensitive to situations in which a partner received a better reward 
(Freeman et al., in review). 
10. Owl Monkeys 
Owl monkeys (genus Aotus) are also New World monkeys that, while not considered 
cooperative breeders, are monogamous and rely on dual-parental care for the survival of 
offspring (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2001; Wright, 1994). Food sharing has been observed in the 
wild (Wolovich et al., 2008b) and captivity (Wolovich et al., 2006; Wolovich et al., 2008a). They 
also exhibit biparental care, a form of cooperation in which males help to transport and groom 
infants (Rotundo et al., 2002; Rotundo et al., 2005; Wright, 1984). However, as with the 
cooperative breeders, owl monkeys did not respond negatively to inequity in an experimental 
context (Freeman et al, in review). 
 
 
